In 1954, one writer, contributing to Food for Thought's special issue on "The Family in Canada," declared that "NEVER in its long history has the human family been the subject of so much study and examination as in our generation." ' While this statement served to underscore both the heightened interest and the ongoing concern that surrounded the Canadian family, it is arguable that this was by no means a new phenomenon. Given the historical linkages made between the 'family' and 'nation', the well-being and stability of the family has consistently been the focus of intense scrutiny. In effect, the persistent fear that the family may be threatened or in a state of crisis has often engendered an even more fundamental anxiety that the very foundation of the nation was being undermined. In this regard, the post-World War 11 period was no exception.
What was significant about the closing years of World War I1 and the immediate postwar era, was that this period witnessed a concerted attempt to restabilize the family, especially after the perceived familial disruptions caused by the socio-economic and gender dislocations of the Depression and the War. But the question of how the reconstitution and continued stability of the family were to be achieved became the subject of considerable discussion and controversy. Through an examination of two wartime inquiries specifically devoted to the issue of women and the family, it is evident that what emerged from these discussions involved both an ideological redefinition of the nature of maritayfamilial relations and an increased emphasis on the moral obligations of the state to provide the socio-economic conditions necessary to protect the welfare of the Canadian family. For state policymakers, however, the fundamental difficulties associated with the introduction of a national family policy, as indicated by the debates surrounding the 1944 Family Allowances Act, rested largely on the very economic and cultural diversity of the Canadian family itself. Differentiated along class, rurallurban, EnglishIFrench-Canadian, and ethnic lines, the concept of the 'Canadian family' tended to defy any fixed or homogeneous definition. It was precisely in light of these many centrifugal tendencies and the growing social concerns with various deviant familial categories that the increasing preoccupation with the idealized notion of "the happy united family "' became most evident. In effect, this mystifying concept signified what was increasingly deemed to be the prescribed essence of the 'postwar modern family' and hence, became a potent ideological force.
As the most basic unit of civil society and indeed capturing the 'common sense' of everyday life, it is perhaps not surprising that metaphors of the 'united' and 'harmonious' family were invoked to describe Canadian nationhood both in terms of its international status and its domestic relations in the postwar period. In effect, rather than representing discrete categories, the intimatelprivatized realm and the politicallpublic sphere intersected at the level of imagery, giving the notion of Canada a particularly vivid quality. While a plethora of images were used to describe the complexities associated with Canadian nationhood, familial metaphors attempted to capture the sentimentalized and, indeed, non-politicized core of a seemingly intangible national unity. Conversely, in the face of growing national divisiveness particularly revolving around the reemergence of French-Canadian nationalism in the early 1960s, images of 'familial' and especially 'marital' breakdown surfaced in the discourse of English-and French-Canadian relations. As politicians, journalists, historians, and particularly the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism increasingly grappled with the difficulties of Canadian self-definition and identity, it is arguable that much of this recourse to analogy and metaphor emerged out of the seeming impossibility of defining a much sought-after national essence. In many respects, Vincent Massey seemed to encapsulate what would become an ongoing Canadian problematic when he wrote in 1948: "A discussion of Canadian unity invites an enquiry into what we are trying to unite: the essence of Canada itself. It is easier to say what Canada is not, than what it is."
This essay, then, will attempt a preliminary exploration of the 'Canadian family' in two senses -as both the social and ideological foundation of the Canadian nation, and as one metaphorical and discursive source for the construction of Canadian nationhood during a particular historical p e r i~d .~ While both the notion of the family and the concept of Canada tended to evade easy definitions, it would seem that in attempting to capture what it is, the discursive interplay of notions of 'family' and 'nation' served to underscore how a naturalized and idealized meaning of the 'family' could provide a metaphorical microcosm for capturing the emotive essence of and redefining the responsibilities of the state as fundamentally necessary for ensuring the economic security and internal stability of the Canadian family. With the exception of those who, like Charlotte Whitton, argued that the "tragedy and suffering" of the Depression had ultimately served as a source of national strength and had built a "steadier" Canadian character," most parliamentarians and social commentators agreed that the economic devastation and destitution of countless numbers of rural and urban families during the 1930s had had disastrous effects on the human resources of the nation. For example, declining fertility rates among Canadian mothers had symbolized the diminished status of children as an additional familial burden rather than as a "cherished and precious possession ... greeted with happy expectancy." Moreover, the high rates of infant and maternal deaths, the threatened physical health of an entire generation, and the subversion of the unemployed male breadwinner's traditional familial authority were but a few of the many negative consequences associated with the economics of subsistence and reliance on sub-standard municipal relief. In effect, given the extreme economic dislocation of the Depression and the lack of any adequate response by the state in the face of this widespread deprivation, the future welfare of the family signified acentral component in the process of redefining the role of the state as protector against the "major economic and social hazards of life." l"
Despite the enhanced employment opportunities generated by the wartime economy, the requirements of wartime austerity, the imposition of wage controls, and an increasingly critical housing crisis tended to mitigate against any real sense of economic security for many Canadian families. In 1941, one Canadian mother, writing in response to a speech made by an American sociologist urging women to bear more children, seemed to capture some of the personal frustrations associated with wartime motherhood, which she linked to the hopes of the 'new order':
If my husband whose wages are just enough to meet the needs of the ones and twos but not enough to cover the requirements of the threes and fours ... is it then really my civic duty to produce these milkless, shoeless little ones? Or isn't it the civic duty of the eminent sociologists and national administrators so to order the social system that I can gladly produce my threes and fours? ... And so we say that when the war is over, we are willing to consider the birthrate only upon our own terms ... have had enough of poverty and congestion, of aching backs and swollen feet and of aging before our time. We have had enough of producing children who are cheated of their birthright of good food and good surroundings almost before they are born ... Summon us in equal numbers to yourselves for the planning of a new order that is worthy of the name. Ask us to help in general issues even by dragging in the personal and the 'trivial' (the price of milk, the washing of diapers, the aching feet) ... And if together we can plan world federated societies where hunger and exhaustion and remediable ill-health are unknown and war has become a forgotten evil of the past, then how gladly we will produce the threes and fours ... or even the fives and sixes."
In addition to ongoing economic constraints, the war itself generated further disruptions which engendered a new series of anxieties. While the "Canadian home" was described as "a shrine to which the thoughts and yearnings of [the] men overseas turn as to a fixed star," l* the prolonged separation of spouses had resulted in growing marital estrangement, the perceived proliferation of extra-marital relationships, and an alarming rise in the rates of divorce and legal separations. Combined with what was described as the loosening of the 'social control' associated with stable marital sexual relations, the recruitment of single and then married women into the war industries caused growing unease about the physical effects of the long hours and often dangerous working conditions, especially on the future reproductive capacities of Canadian mothers. Furthermore, the neglect of children due to the increasing number of working mothers, together with poor housing conditions, were considered by some to be the primary causes of rising rates of juvenile delinquency. And finally, the growing economic independence and self-reliance of married women, the perceived relaxation of sexual morals among single youths with the concomitant rise in illegitimacy rates, and the increase in hasty and unstable wartime marriages, had seemingly wreaked havoc on the prospects of future familial stability.I3 As one press correspondent lamented, "Home life depends on peace. Home life is the first casualty of war." l4 Given this growing unease around the "dark and uncertain future7' of the family, it is perhaps not surprising that, amidst the flurry of postwar planning, at least two committees -the government-commissioned but short-lived Subcommittee on the Post-War Problems of Women (1943) and the independent Canadian Youth Commission's Committee on the Family (1943-1947)15 -were specifically created to investigate and to make recommendations on issues relating to the future of women and the family in the postwar period. What seems most significant about these two inquiries was that both strongly advocated an ideological reconceptualization of the internal dynamics of maritallfamilial relations, but also tended to stress that economic security remained the fundamental basis for the reconstitution and ongoing stability of the family. And, while each inquiry recommended a broad spectrum of state policies designed to provide the socio-economic conditions necessary for improving and protecting the welfare of the family, this issue became enshrined in the Liberal government's major national family policy initiative -the highly controversial 1944
Family Allowances Act.I6 During this crucial period, when the reassertion of the hegemony of familialism became an issue of central importance, these various discussions of the family sewed to underscore not only the perceived necessity for redefining maritallfamilial relationships, but also the seeming absence of a homogeneous entity inscribed in the notion of the 'Canadian family' particularly as an object of state policy. While the terms of reference of the Women's Subcommittee involved an examination of all aspects of postwar problems relating to women, much of the inquiry focused on the potential difficulties that would confront the estimated 1.2 million women, who, as of November 1943, were gainfully employed in various war and civilian economic sectors.
In addressing what it viewed as the different postwar employment and family needs of single women, rural women, married women at home, and married women employed either on a full or part-time basis, the Subcommittee's recommendations reflected an underlying tension. The explicit recognition that the self-definition and status of women had been profoundly altered by the war was tempered by the perceived requirements of both the postwar economy and the postwar family. In order to overcome these contradictory tendencies and as a compensation for the "work and sacrifice" of women during the war, the committee not only introduced the notions of "choice" and "equality of opportunity" as part of the new ideological vocabulary of women's "full citizenship," but also attempted to redefine the family and especially marital relations on a new ideological basis.17 At the outset, the Subcommittee emphasized that the "right to choose" should be made available to all categories of women. In the case of single working women, this right not only involved decisions relating to their marital status and choice of vocation, but also meant the enjoyment of "equality of remuneration, working conditions and opportunity for advancement" with men. This egalitarian principle, however, underwent at least two qualifications. Given the envisaged requirements of the postwar labour market, the Subcommittee strongly recommended that single women be 'encouraged' to withdraw from the industrial labour force and undergo retraining to fill critical labour shortages in such undesirable employment sectors as farm labour and domestic service. At the same time, they confidently predicted that a considerable portion of single women would exercise the strong and "normal urge towards marriage, and home, and family life," which, in their view, would "very much simplify the postwar problems of women." l s
This tension between advocating the extension of women's 'citizenship rights' and ultimately relying on the common sense of 'natural inclination' also emerged in the discussion of married women. In this regard, the Subcommittee argued that "the right to choose is not going to operate to make every woman, or even much larger groups of women want to leave their homes for the labour market." As an implicit compensation for those married women who did return to, or remained in the home, the Subcommittee advocated a ideological realignment of marital relations. By appropriating and rearticulating the egalitarian discourse of the new democratic order, the Subcommittee argued that, in the interests of "happier homes and, therefore, a happier democracy," marriage itself should undergo a process of democratization. More specifically, as articulated in the highly popular 1942 Beveridge Report, the concept of "team" or "equal partnership" were to become the defining qualities of postwar marital relations. This ideal of egalitarian marriage, which one Canadian 18 In order to achieve this, the Subcommittee made specific recommendations for making rural sociologist argued was an important component of the "emancipated family," tended to offer married woman a new and compensatory 'subject-position'. Marriage, child-rearing, and housework were to attain the positive status of a vocation "on a par with any other occupation" and equal in value to paid labour. Thus, the Subcommittee concluded:
the homemaker gives a tremendous contribution to the building up of a healthy, happy and efficient Canadian people. It follows that any government which desires to build a true democracy, of which such homes are the foundation, must do everything in its power to create conditions under which such homes can be successfully maintained. Moreover, the homemaker, though classified in the census as not gainfully employed, is engaged in an occupation which has a vital economic value to the community ... The economic value of the wife's work becomes clear if the cost to the husband of replacing the services rendered by the wife in her purely occupational aspects is kept in mind."
In addition, among its many recommendations, the Subcommittee strongly advocated the introduction of a system of family allowances. In their view, such a system would serve several purposes. On the one hand, the provision of monthly allowances would contribute to the achievement of "desirable conditions of family life for children" by mitigating "the poverty arising from the fact that a man's wage must be based on the product of a man's labour and not on the size of his family." At the same time, the Subcommittee stressed its psychological importance, particularly for those working mothers who 'planned' to return to their full-time but unpaid occupation as homemakers. In this regard, the payment of family allowances to housewives/mothers would not only alleviate "the mental attitude which may result from the surrender of the double income," but also would serve as a material recognition of the economic value of their services.20 In 1947, one journalist reiterated this increasing popular notion of the housewife/mother as a 'national economic asset,' when she pointed out:
Everyone recognizes that the work of the homemaker is of supreme social importance but few realize its economic value. The housewife is usually regarded as being 'kept' by her husband and as the one who spends what he earns. In reality, housewives who assume the major responsibility for household tasks make an important contribution to their families' real income, and homemaking is perhaps the nation's major enterprise. A larger number of persons are engaged in the full-time job of homemaking than in any other occupation and the total economic contribution of homemakers exceeds that of the workers in any other single industry.
Meticulously calculating the "dollar" or "replacement" value of a homemaker's unpaid services, the author noted that even though "the economic value of their work is omitted from estimates of national income," the work of a housewife had "an important bearing on ... the standard of living not only of the family but of the nation."
Indeed, according to her estimates, the full-time housewife's services were not only worth more economically than she could earn in the paid labour force, but also meant such non-calculable benefits as "more comforts" and "more contentment" for the family." Although the author did concede that working-class wives often found it financially necessary to enter paid employment, her general position clearly represented a thinly-veiled apologetic favouring full-time homemaking as the preferred occupation for married women. At the same time, however, in this period of domestic retrenchment, the category of 'housewife/mother' as both 'equal partner' and as 'gainfully employed' was undergoing an ideological rearticulation and this rearticulation was a central component in the process of reasserting the hegemony of farnilialism.
After an extensive four-year study of the Canadian family, the Canadian Youth Commission's Family Committee addressed the question of postwar familial democracy from a somewhat different perspective. In contrast to the Subcommittee's report, the Commission's approach to the postwar family was premised on a highly sentimentalized model of what it viewed as the unique qualities of the Canadian pioneer rural family. With the exception of what was described as the "statistically deviant behaviour" of families in French Canada and among certain unspecified "European immigrant groups,"22 Canada's particular climatic and geographic features had ultimately moulded the egalitarian nature of Canadian familial relations. In their view, the patriarchal family structure and indeed even inter-familial class differences that characterized "old-world communities" had been rendered virtually obsolete by the democratizing forces of "the snows, the winds, the spaces, the woods and rocks of Canada" : Few Canadian families are so far removed in time from pioneer conditions that the effects of those rugged conditions cannot still be seen ... in the great spaces of the Prairies and in the backwoods of the North, Canada moulds her families in ways which are her own, wielding the power of climate and space ... LifeinCanadachanged the family pattern. Frontier conditions introduced no small measure of democracy into family relationships and inter-family relationships. The old-world community had rigidly defined family roles; its influence was now remote, and in the new land the place of each family in the scheme of things became of relatively equal significance. Class distinctions between families were no longer so important to people faced with common hardships and the need for co-operation ... Within the family, no person was unimportant; the work of each was essential in the hard struggle with nature.
Given thls nostalgic portrait of both social relations on the frontier and domestic relations within the pioneer rural family, the Commission implicitly suggested that the construction of a substantively new egalitarian family ideology was largely unnecessary. Rather, any ideological redefinition of the postwar familial relations merely required translating and rearticulating Canada's natural heritage into an increasingly modem, urban environment. Or, as the Committee argued, this meant " strengthen[ing] the tendency, originating on the frontier, towards more democratic family relationship^."^^ For the Family Committee, the (English-Canadian) rural household continued to signify many of the positive qualities and essential values associated with the 'Canadian family tradition'. Despite the recognition that rural life was undergoing transformation, cooperation, partnership, and stability seemingly remained the enduring characteristics of rural family life. While wives and children maintained their role as 'equal partners' in the cooperative family economy, the familial unit also continued to discharge its duties as the primary institution for vocational and educational training, for the protection and transmission of social, cultural and religious values, and for the care of the aged and the infirm. For instance, the familial stability which characterized the agricultural and fishing communities of Prince Edward Island signified something of a statistical ideal, particularly in light of its steady birthrate coupled with the lowest incidents of divorce, legal separations and illegitimacy in the nation.24 Moreover, as one commentator insisted in a 1947 article entitled, "First Aid for the Family", one of the best means of reasserting and strengthening national "family-mindedness" was by making "good old-fashioned rural life more "attractive." In order to emphasize this point, the author cited the following description of one rural area in the prairie provinces: "There is little juvenile delinquency, but a wholesome and democratic family life, lots of reasonably early marriages, and the young couples are gradually taking over the farms on the edges of their home district and spreading these patterns. There is mighty little divorce in that part of the province!" The author also offered an explicit warning to those particularly young rural families who were contemplating migration to an urban environment, stressing that "when a family moves from farm to city it may take the first long step toward disintegration." For this social commentator, the American-influenced individualistic values as opposed to the family-based Canadian values that characterized the city were synonymous with the high risks of marital and familial disharmony and breakdown. "Only as society is based on the family", he concluded, "and uses all its powers to maintain and strengthen the family, can modem society hope to survive." 25 This correlation between the city and maritallfamilial friction and instability, however, tended to intersect most explicitly in discussions of the working-class family. Usually linked to poor housing conditions andlor shortages, and the persistent anxieties generated by economic insecurity, including the absence of a decent family wage and inadequate social security legislation, the welfare and stability of the working-class family became a central component in the discourse of the 'new social order' and in the policies of the state. For example, amidst the controversy surround- ing the implementation of the Family Allowances Act in 1944, in which both supporters and opponents of the legislation vied for the legitimate right to speak on behalf of the interests of Canadian children, the working-class family as a variouslydefined object of a national family policy figured pred~minantly.~~
The legislation was premised on the declared principle that the state had a "moral obligation" not only to contribute to ensuring the minimum well-being of children, but also to elevate and preserve the standard of family life rather than leave it to the "accident of individual incomes." This meant that every Canadian child regardless of class, raciallethnic or religious background was to enjoy "equality of opportunity in the battle of life."27 According to the Liberal government, however, the main beneficiaries of family allowances would be those rural, and particularly workingclass families, whose family wage was insufficient to provide bare necessities and who were ineligible for tax exemptions based on the number of dependent^.^' Consistently emphasizing that this supplement to the family wage constituted a right, as opposed to a form of charity, and thus, marked the beginnings of greater social equality, both liberal and social-democratic parliamentarians tended to welcome this extension of middle-class familial rights and benefits to the working-class family."
While justifications for this legislation were veiled in the language of democratic egalitarianism and the perceived humanitarian necessity for the "strong to assist the weak," it was also legitimated by purely economic considerations. As several Liberal MPS argued, the provision of family allowances could best be interpreted as a sound investment both in the physical, mental, and moral development of the human assets of the nation, and as a payment to the working-class family for its services to the state. In the former case, the working-class family as a unit of reproduction would not only be assisted materially in building a "better citizenry," but also a more "healthy, intelligent, adaptable, and productive" rising generation of workers, that would ultimately enhance the efficiency of Canada's industrial economy. In the latter case, by narrowing the gap between the male breadwinner's earning power and his familial responsibilities and especially by enhancing the consumptive capacity of workingclass families, industrial production and employment would stabilize and expand, wages would increase, and the major sources of labour unrest would largely dimini~h .~~ On the question of wages, however, many sectors of organized labour remained skeptical, particularly in light of the introduction of wartime wage controls. Initially opposing the bill, the Trades and Labour Congress, for example, argued that the provision of family allowances would ultimately be utilized by employers as a substitute for "paying adequate wages to enable families to live in decency and health." And, although the CCF supported the bill, parliamentary members repeatedly insisted that the family allowances scheme should be regarded as only the initial stage in the development of a more comprehensive social security programme, and that it should not be utilized "either to depress the prices of agricultural products, the floor under commodities, or to depress wages." 31 For the most adamant opponents of the legislation, including the Progressive Conservatives and social welfare advocates like Charlotte Whitton and C.E. Silcox, the payment of family allowances not only meant undue government intervention into what 'God and Nature' intended to be the sole responsibility and burden of parenthood, but also constituted a misplaced and open invitation to promiscuous working-class spending. This did not imply, they insisted, that they did not support the principle of better social and welfare provisions for enhancing the well-being of children and family life among the so-called 'masses'. In their view, however, offering indiscririnate "cash hand-outs" to working-class parents without obligations, without a means test, or the administrative machinery to "'screen out' trustworthy from incompetent or culpable parents," all amounted to unsound social planning and the ultimate destruction of the incentive to work. Premised on the assumption that working-class parents were tendentially irresponsible, this oppositional group claimed that, in many cases, working-class parents failed to exercise adequate control of their reproductive 'urges', especially in relation to their economic capacities. At the same time, there was simply little guarantee that working-class children would benefit from the monthly allocation of the so-called 'diaper doles'. As one Conservative M.P. argued, this would be the case particularly with those "shiftless", "lazy" and "unscrupulous" parents who would spend the allowances unwisely and then become chronically dependent on further government charity .32 Not surprisingly, in the House of Commons debates, the CCF protested against these disparaging suppositions by pointing out that they constituted nothing less than an insult to the industrious labouring classes and the humble poor.33 The Liberal M.P.s, on the other hand, tended to defend the working-class family not so much by emphasizing its trustworthiness, but rather by stressing that the instinctual love and protective feelings of parents for their children as well as the possibilities of a more educated parenthood would mitigate against the abuse of government funds.34 In the end, the legislation reached an implicit compromise in which the construction of gender became indelibly encoded in the Act. By uncoupling the controversial notion of the 'working-class parent', the final provisions of the legislation specified that, whenever possible, the mother rather than father would be the direct recipient of the payments. This provision was premised on the suggestion that the mother, as primarily-responsible for the maintenance and care of children, could be relied upon to be inherently more re~ponsible.~~ While these perceived innate qualities of motherhood could be depended upon in the majority of cases, the legislation also introduced an additional safeguard which provided for close provincial and municipal surveillance of working-class families in order to eliminate any flagrant abuse.36 32 Silcox, Canada Must Choose: The Revenge of the Cradles, 2, 12-15, 27; Whitton, Canada Must Choose, Baby Bonuses: Dollars or Sense?, 14-17 and Whitton, "Are Baby Grants the Answer We Need?," 6. As one writer in Canadian Forum noted with regard to Whitton, "... if you listen to her for a short time you soon discover that her real objection to them is that she doesn't trust working-class parents to spend their income with any sense of reponsibility." "Family Allowance Feud," Canadian Forum 24, 284 (September 1944 On one level, then, the family allowances debate centred around the potential implications of supplementing the family wage, which intersected with varied assumptions about the working-class family and working-class motherhood. But, in many respects, the real crux of much of the controversy revolved around the somewhat dubious claim that the legislation was 'foreign' for Canada because the nation's population, as compared to countries such as Britain and France, did not comprise a homogeneous "organic unity."37 AS a result, the introduction of family allowances was considered nothing less than a potential threat to national unity. This component of the debate itself operated on several levels. As the Leader of the Opposition argued, the unsuitability of granting monthly payments to all families on an equitable graduated basis rested on the absence of any unitary and identifiable needs among different Canadian families. In a curious twist of logic, he pointed out that this denied the "basic principles of social justice" : Charlotte Whitton, on the other hand, promoting the slogan, "intelligent maternity and responsible paternity," was principally concerned with the question of eugenics. In her view, family allowances would merely encourage "indiscriminate breeding" among the the unfit and the feeble-minded, whose relation to, in her words, "social disease, illegitimacy, degeneration, promiscuity, and common law marriages is common knowledge." But her most vociferous attack was reserved for certain "vicious and irresponsible parents" living in unspecified yet evidently economically depressed areas which she termed the " hinterlands" :
There are large tracts in the hinterlands of every Province, except Prince Edward Island, wherein .. . children are being bred and reared too often at the standard of brute creation . .. Slowly progressive deterioration is overtaking both the land and the people thereon ... The cancer is not susceptible to individual treatment and affects tens of thousands of children in the aggregate. The automatic mailing of cheques or remitting of actual cash to families of such type and areas is equivalent to pouring public money into a cesspool which will enlarge and seep through the poisoning of the life of those stable sections of the population upon which it will thrive and batten.39
But perhaps the central focus of the whole controversy revolved around what was described as the "fashionable" and extraordinary "natural virility" of the FrenchCanadian family. In this regard, the notion that national unity was at stake was premised on the argument that English Canada, and especially Ontario, would be forced to bear the tax burden and subsidize Quebec's much higher proportion of large familie~.~" Comparing French-Canadian parents to "the cuckoo which lays its eggs in the nests of more decent and self-respecting birds," C.E. Silcox suggested that, if Quebec's own "distinctive cultural theories create the problem; their own remedies should solve it ... as a community we must work for what we get and we must firmly squelch those individuals and groups who try to sponge on the rest of us." 41 Or, as one journalist emphasized, calculated in purely economic terms, the scheme was sure to generate resentment in English Canada, which could have negative consequences for the Liberals in the impending federal election:
Total bonuses of six or seven hundred dollars or even a thousand dollars a year will be common in Quebec whereas the heads of families of two or three children in the English-speaking part of the population would be getting at most only two or three hundred dollars. The proposed reduction in the rates of allowance for families of more than four children are not regarded as sufficient to sweeten the proposition for parents of the average size English-speaking family."
The recourse to the issue of national unity also constituted a thinly-veiled yet perhaps more discreet means of resurrecting the bogey of French-Canadian fertility rates and the fears of 'race suicide'. One Conservative M.P., however, was less than discreet. Referring to Hitler's campaign to raise the birthrate in Nazi Germany, he stressed what he viewed to be the possible implications of allocating monthly payments to Canadian families:
If we are to encourage large families, then I think care should be taken that they are eugenically of the kind that will be most likely to improve our race. This bill will result in many cases in bonusing families who have been unwilling to defend their country. May I venture to suggest that our object should be quality rather than quantity?3 Similarly, C.E. Silcox, armed with statistics from the latest census records, was quick to point out that while the birthrates of the English, Irish, and Scottish populations showed a marked decline, fertility rates in Quebec were on the increase. Furthermore, given that family allowances would "be used to push even higher the fertility of French Canadian women," and given that Quebec had supposedly launched various 'colonization' strategies in other provinces, he predicted that as early as 1961, Canada would be predominantly Roman Catholic, and by 1971, predominantly French. 44 Although the 'race suicide' hysteria did not wholly focus on French-Canadians but also included Central Europeans and the Japane~e:~ taken together, family allow-ances were perceived as inevitably leading to the economic, social, and cultural submersion of Anglo-Canadian Protestant sectors of the p o p~l a t i o n .~~ Not surprisingly, at least one Quebec M.P. accused those English-Canadians who vented such "narrow-mindedness and intolerance" of exacerbating and fomenting greater national disunity, while another stressed that large Quebec families served as the central institutional mechanism for the ongoing cultural survival of French Canada!7 In general, however, many participants in this debate repeatedly stressed that it would require more than an allowance of five dollars or eight dollars a month to stimulate drastic increases in birthrates among any sector of the Canadian populat i on!' And, one writer even concluded that rather than generating heightened national disunity, the family allowances scheme, by allocating payments to mothers on an equitable basis, would ultimately promote a "feeling of kinship between all parts of the country and all If, indeed, the Family Allowances Act was part of the campaign to reconstitute, stabilize, and strengthen the postwar family in general and the working-class family in particular, the heated controversy surrounding its implementation became riddled with various contradictory assumptions. These assumptions not only revolved around the nature of the working-class family, but also around one seemingly essential difference between the English-and French-Canadian family. In effect, the debate tended to underscore the difficulties of introducing a Canadian national family policy given the very economic and cultural diversity of Canada's 'national family'. Needless to say, the furor surrounding the legislation seemed to subside after the issuance of the first allotments in July 1945.50 At the same time, however, the French-Canadian family did remain the subject of some, albeit less heated, discussion and interest.
The Canadian Youth Commission's Family Committee, for example, pointed out that Quebec families were a sufficiently distinct cultural entity to warrent "special consideration." Apart from emphasizing the higher fertility rates, particularly among rural Catholic French-Canadians, and the generally low incidents of illegitimacy and divorce, the Family Committee stressed that one of the main distinguishing features between the French-Canadian and the English-Canadian family was rooted in the traditional patriarchai structure and strong extended kinship ties of the former, as opposed to the democratic and egalitarian relationships, and the conjugal autonomy, of the latter.51 In subsequent decades, however, some family sociologists increasingly began to emphasize that the internal dynamics of the French-Canadian family and kinship system were neither traditionally patriarchal nor inherently egalitarian, but rather highly rnatrifocal. In their view, this was exemplified not only in the central figure of the French-Canadian mother, but also in the dominant position or even 'benign dictatorship' of the French-Canadian grandm~ther.~' English-Canadian discussions of the 'otherness' and culturally distinct qualities of the French-Canadian family were not solely limited to scholarly investigations or sociological studies. Rather, many of the seemingly entrenched assumptions surrounding what was perceived as the relatively unchanging nature of Quebec family life were perpetuated in the national press in the 1950s and the early 1960s. In 1957, for instance, the 65,000-strong, "pious" and "highly prolific" Tremblay clan, that laid claim to having the "biggest single family tree in the world," captured national attention. While the 6,000 members of the clan had gathered in Chicoutimi for a one-day family convention, the journalist, who reported the story, was principally interested in RosaTremblay.Somewhat reminiscent of the portrayal of Elzire Dionne, the mother of the famous Dionne quintuplets, Rosa Tremblay was not only described as both a fervent Catholic and a devoted wife, she also symbolized the French-Canadian mother who had managed to break virtually all maternity records: Rosa Tremblay, the plumpish, apple-cheeked wife of Paul Emile Tremblay of Alma, Quebec, is typical in many ways of the average Tremblay mother. Rosa has achieved unique distinction by giving birth to seven sets of twins and three single babies in just over ten years -or more children in less time than any other woman in Canada. She is thirty-four, and her penchant for twin births is unprecedented in modem medical annals ... Most French Canadians are familiar with large families, though, and they tend to ignore the fact that Rosa's case has made medical history.53 
Despite the relatively persistent assumptions and images constructed around the French-Canadian family, by the late 1940s, what increasingly emerged out of all the diverse and often contradictory meanings surrounding and inscribed in the whole notion of the 'Canadian family' was a preoccupation with what was termed the 'modern farnil~.'~' In most respects, it could be argued that, by the 1950s and the early 1960s, the defining features of this familial category had become synonymous with the common sense and normative notion of the family.
According to the Youth Commission's Family Committee, the modem family was not only characterized by 'internal familial democracy' and 'equal partnership' between husbands and wives, but also had lost or was in the process of surrendering most of its traditional economic, social, and cultural responsibilities to various external private agencies and especially to the expanding public institutions of the state. As the modern family was progressively stripped of its traditional functions, its primary role and indeed, its 'essence' became almost exclusively interlinked with the provision of "close affectionate relationships, personal ties, happiness of belonging and being loved."57 In effect, as many family commentators increasingly argued, the growing impersonalized environment of the'modern age' had rendered the natural and core relationships of marriage and parenthood of fundamental importance. And, ensuring the preservation of these emotional ties, which now served "as chief guarantee of family solidarity" and the essential basis of the "sound, harmonious family," became one of the central responsibilities of various private and public institutions. This ideological construction of the prescribed 'essence' of the modern family was perhaps best articulated in Governor-General Vanier's message to Canada's first National Conference on the Family in 1964, a conference described in the press as "the biggest family bull session in Canadian history":
Many years of observation, experience and study have convinced my wife and me that happy and united families make a happy and united community . . . Parents, united by ties of affection and devoid of self-interest ... plant the first seeds of love, generosity and selflessness and thus fashion and guide youth on the way to becoming citizens devoted to noble causes for the common good.58
Given this increasingly idealized notion of the family, it is perhaps not surprising that a growing army of experts, including, above all, social workers, child psychologists, marriage counsellors, and family life educators increasingly emerged between the late 1940s and the early 1960s. Espousing a preventative policy against maritavfamilial breakdown, they supplied a wealth of advice on the requirements of stable marriages, the necessity for internal familial communication, and on how mothers were to raise their children 'more dem~cratically.'~' Moreover, one writer in Food For Thought's special 1951 issue on parent education also emphasized the fundamental national importance of democratic familial relations:
Probably the largest groups of adults in Canadaunited by acommon bond areparents . .. there is no form of adult education more important for the future ... We believe the democratic form of government to be the best one yet evolved on this planet. Most adults in the democracies of today were raised in dictatorship homes ... There is ground for believing that if the next generation can learn self-control by democratic methods in their youth, they may be able to do a better job at controlling the destiny And, indeed, as the Family Committee had predicted, sound marriages and educated motherhood/parenthood had increasingly become nothing short of a" skilled trade." 6' During the postwar period, this process of increasingly constructing the notion of the family around a seemingly definable and essential core not only tended to facilitate the ideological reassertion of familial hegemony after the disruptions of the Depression and the Second World War, but also served to obscure the unequal gender relations that persisted within the institution of marriage and the family. Thus, suggesting that the postwar ideology of familialism was inscribed with such idealized concepts as 'equal partnership' and 'familial democracy,' which became interlinked with the notion of the 'happy, united family', does not mean perpetuating the myth of the family as a 'haven in a heartless world'. Nor does it imply that gender relations and the unequal power relations between husbands and wives were fundamentally altered by the war. Rather, what it does intimate is that the 'retreat to domesticity' that characterized the postwar period was by no means an unambiguous process.62 According to Ruth Pierson, for example, one of the greatest anxieties that emerged during the war was the fear of" women slamming the door on domestic dependence and assailing the segregation of jobs by sex." Underlying this fear was the even greater anxiety that women would achieve sexual independence outside the parameters of maritallfamilial relations. In this regard, the government's steady withdrawal of the childcare services and the income tax incentives that had facilitated the wartime labour participation of working mothers, and the simultaneous introduction of family allowances, clearly contributed to the retreat to the domestic sphere during the immediate postwar period.63 Despite these factors, however, that housewives and mothers were offered the promise and the recognition that they were not only a 'national asset,' but also members of a 'team' or an 'equal partnership' -notions that were subsequently perpetuated both in the family literature and in mass media images of the 'happy housewife consumer'64 -became central components of the ideological package of domestic retrenchment. Moreover, given that the ideological construction of the family became cloaked in the discourse of postwar egalitarianism, it is perhaps not surprising that when Betty Friedan, in her book, The Feminine Mystique (1963), sought to demystify gender relations within the family and to explicate women's domestic subordination and economic dependency, these aspects of women's oppression were described as "the problem that has no name." 65 At the same time, this conception of the family both as a privatized collective entity based on an assumed mutuality of interests, and as the natural and essential source of affective ties and a sense of belonging, also became an ideological feature that could potentially be shared by all families regardless of differentiations based on class and racelethnicity. With the partial exception of the French-Canadian family, at least prior to the Quiet Revolution, one key distinction among families in much of the family literature was premised largely on the indices of 'harmony' or 'breakdown'. And, as the following section will attempt to demonstrate, it was these particular definitions of the family that became the discursive source of the maritallfamilial metaphors that sought to articulate the various meanings associated with Canadian 'nationhood' and with issues related to national dislunity and to forging a national identity in the postwar period. This metaphorical intersection between the private and the political perhaps surfaced most explicitly in the parliamentary discussions surrounding the 1946 Canadian Citizenship Act and during the nationwide tours of the Royal Commission of Bilingualism and Biculturalism in the early 1960s.
TWO
I say, let us extract from the English and French characteristics and from any other culture, whatever is good in them, to achieve a distinctive, Canadian mentalityremembering ... The Canadian Citizenship Act of 1946 was literally 'born' amidst a patriotic flourish of familial discourse. As both the symbol and substance of Canada's greater sense of status and nationhood after the Second World War, familial metaphors were invoked not only to capture Canada's ongoing ties with and membership in the "British family of nations,"'j6 but also to define the sense of 'familial unity' that was to become inscribed in the notion of a distinct Canadian citizenship. For example, in his opening remarks during the second reading of the bill, the Secretary of State emphasized that its intention was not only to provide "an unambiguous definition of the status of Canadian citizenship," but also that the legislation ultimately signified Canada's "aspirations as a nation for the future" :
For the national unity of Canada and for the future and greatness of this country, it is felt to be of the utmost importance that all of us, new Canadians or old, have a consciousness of a common purpose and common interests as Canadians; that all of us be able to say with pride and say with meaning: 'I am a Canadian citizen' .. .. there is no finer club in the world so far as we are concerned than the club that I would characterize as the Canadian family.
In the subsequent parliamentary debates around this declared principle of the Act, both English-and French-Canadian politicians tended to agree that this new symbol of Canada's national identity would contribute to the "crystallization of Canadian nationhood," an enhanced sense of familial "oneness," and even, as one M.P. suggested, the creation of a distinct "Canadian At the same time, despite these shared perceptions of what arguably amounted to a newly-defined national 'we,' at least two divergent assumptions were articulated in relation to the underlying basis of the Canadian 'national family'.
Several English-Canadian M.P.s, for instance, repeatedly stressed that the constitution of a distinct Canadian citizenship was best understood as inextricably linked with forging a "homogeneous" and "unhyphenated national community. Premised on the suggestion that " hyphenated" or "ersatz" Canadianism was synonymous with the absence of an appropriate sense of national family-mindedness, they envisioned a nation free of all "unfortunate national quarrels" and of all "clashing differences," be they on the regional, provincial, or ethno-cultural level. For example, as the Secretary of State pointed out, what was fundamentally necessary was to forge a sense of "national unity out of diversity" :
If there is one thing from which we in Canada have suffered, to the detriment of this magnificent country, it is from a feeling of divisiveness-lack of that fervent and urgent unity that can make a people work together as a great community with conviction that the welfare of all is the goal of their effort. It is not enough to be a good "Bluenose" or a good Ontarian or a good Albertan. Sectional difference and sectional interests must be overcome if we are to do our best for Canada. . . No matter where we come from or what our origins, French, English, Scandinavian, Scottish, Ukrainian, Irish or whatever else, one thing at least we can all be, and that is Canadians.
Another M.P. echoed this sentiment when he stated that, "citizenship means ninety per cent of interests that we have in common comes ahead of the ten per cent of the things that divide us."6s
In order to foster this new sense of national identity, especially in the face of an evident multitude of ethnic diversities, the establishment of appropriate mechanisms for the admission particularly of so-called new Canadians into the 'national family' became one central focus of concern. As several M.P.s emphasized, the new legislation should provide for "a more effective and impressive ceremony of admission into the Canadian family." Such a ceremony, they argued, would not only impress upon new Canadians both the privileges and responsibilities of citizenship, but also symbolize their belonging to and full partnership in "the great family of the Canadian nation." This patriotic vision of national unity, however, was tempered when one Quebec M.P. sought to remind his fellow parliamentarians that national harmony could not be achieved without "teaching all Canadians that their country, as a matter of fact and reality, is a bicultural, bilingual one." In this regard, he emphasized "the effort made by the French-speaking population to understand its English-speaking compatriots and the lack of cooperation given in the other directions." And, as an implicit warning to English-speaking Canadians, he added that, "unilingualism ... will not help union and understanding between the two big race^."^'
If, in 1946, the declared intention of Canadian Citizenship Act signified at least the possibility of uniting Canada's 'national family' and even of creating an unambiguous and unitary national identity, it became increasingly evident, particularly by the early 1960s, that this possibility had indeed been a fragile one. More specifically, what emerged particularly during the period encompassing the nation-wide regional and public hearings of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism was that the complex substance of Canadian nationhood continued to be riddled with a multiplicity of centrifugal identities. Moreover, in the midst of the growing political challenges generated particularly by the Quiet Revolution in Quebec, the reconstitution and even the redrawing of the contours of the 'Canadian family' had reached a heightened level of national urgency.
While the B & B Commission became the subject of growing controversies, especially with regard to the costs involved as well as the duration of its public hearings and countless research projects,'" it has nonetheless appropriately been described as "a great examination of the Canadian psyche" or, as one participant noted, a "study of our total Canadian ~haracter."'~ In effect, for three years (1963) (1964) (1965) ,72 the Commission offered the Canadian public the opportunity to subject its terms of reference to microscopic scrutiny. And, even though the ten Commissioners often displayed a marked frustration with those who deviated too radically from what virtually amounted to apre-determined definition of Canada, these terms of reference underwent what seemed to be an endless process of debate, negotiation, and dissection. Perhaps one of the most significant outcomes of the various public hearings was that just as the so-called 'Canadian character' could not be identified as a homogeneous phenomenon, so too the notion of Canadian nationhood tended to evade any easy conceptualization. Perhaps Dr. Paul Fox of the University of Toronto best captured some of the problematics involved when he asked, "What do we mean by Confederation? What do we mean by nation? What do we mean by binati~nalism?"~~ It was precisely in attempting to grapple with these and other fundamental questions that the language of familialism, as one of many images invoked to articulate some of the problems surrounding national dis/unity and the complex abstraction of Canada, took on a particular meaning and significance.
One central component of the Commission's stated intention, as outlined in its terms of reference, involved the compilation of an "enormous quantity of facts" in an effort to achieve some understanding of "the existing state of bilingualism and biculturalism in Canada."74 Not surprisingly, then, many of the individuals and organizations that appeared before the Commission were largely concerned either with demonstrating their own individual or collective bilingual practices, or with addressing the technical problems and possibilities of how to promote bilingualism and biculturalism in various sectors of Canadian life. These included, above all, the federal administration and the public service, the economic and mass communications sectors, the educational system as well as public and private cultural associations. As Dr. J. Kidd of the Social Sciences Research Council and Humanities Research Council emphasized, "we would urge the Royal Commission not only to become a great national school of citizenship but that it also be a centre of rigorous, fearless, scientific inquiry." 75 But at the heart of the Commission's declared purpose, defined in the terms of reference as the possible "steps [that] should be taken to develop the Canadian Confederation on the basis of an equal partnership between the two founding races,"76 was an attempt to grapple with and to provide recommendations to alleviate the increasingly strained and fractious relationship between French-and English-speaking Canada. As one journalist later suggested, the role of Commissioners could be likened to "marriage counsellers", who appropriately listened to and noted complaints from both French-and English-speaking C a n a d i a n~.~~ And, indeed, in an attempt to promote a greater sense of national unity and family-mindedness within Canadian domestic relations, the Commission's terms of reference did offer Frenchspeaking Canada a similar status, one revolving around the concept and principle of an 'equal partnership', to the one promised to married women in the postwar family.
This concept of building an 'equal partnership' was partially articulated and constructed through the recurring image that, in the early history of Canada and particularly at the time of Confederation as inscribed in the provisions of the British North America Act, a union of 'marriage' between English-and French-Canada had been forged. For example, P. E. Robert, the general director of the SociCtC Saint-Jean But it was precisely the absence of any "reasonable degree of equality" between French-and English-speaking Canada, whether in the socio-economic, cultural, or linguistic realm, that the concept of an 'equal partnership' was meant to redress. And that French-speaking Quebec, implicitly constructed as the 'frustrated and impatient wife', was in the process of rejecting her subordinate and exploited status under the original terms of the 'marital contract' or, indeed, was on the verge of filing for a 'divorce', did emerge to capture the imagination of at least some English-speaking Canadians, particularly with the rise of nationalist and separatist sentiments in Quebec in the early 1960s.
The recourse to 'marriage' analogies, whether in scholarly writings, in the press, or in the Commission's various public hearings did, however, reflect subtle differences. In 1960, for instance, Lorne Pierce pointed out that achievement of Confederation had effectively defied the predictions of such late nineteenth-century skeptics as Goldwin Smith, who had consistently argued that the "fusing" or "harmonizing" of a "French and Papal and a British and Protestant community" were nothing short of an impossibility. But in describing the 'successful' union of 1867, Pierce utilized the more ambiguous term, 'betrothal', implying the promise of marriage, rather than the actual binding of a matrimonial tie: "In spite of small groups of colonials, in spite of little nests of annexationists, Confederation was achieved, and so successful was this betrothal of the dissimilar and the opposite that a new pattern was established in Canada. " 'O Other English-speaking Canadians, however, were more apt to derive and to construct particular meanings out of the term, 'shotgun wedding.' As suggested by one London resident speaking before one of the Commission's regional hearings in 1964, this notion strongly implied that the political basis of Confederation had been premised on a mutual agreement and had not involved any form of coercion:
Canada is a marriage of two nations and it was not a shotgun marriage, it was a free and deliberate marriage. Now that divorce is in the offing, I think this is a problem for the whole family, and it is time that all the family get together and improve the situation of the family ... it is an intense national problem.81
In contrast, one French-Canadian scholar, writing in the late 1940s, described the that matrimonial relations between the two Canadas were rooted in a 'marriage of convenience,' which was not to be confused, at least in the minds of English-speaking Canadians, with a 'marriage of love.' By the early 1960s, however, these diverse and cumulative shades of meanings, which all attempted to define the historical foundation of relations between the two Canadas, were seemingly overshadowed by a growing preoccupation with the possibility of 'divorce', the growing "danger of a disintegration of Canada."83 Although the heightened demands of French-speaking Quebec reflected a variety of ideological orientations, especially in relation to the precise economic terms and political nature of the 'divorce', the Commission's preliminary report did outline what it perceived as the "common threads" inscribed in Quebec's new sense of self as a "distinct physiognomy." In effect, the growing sense among French-speaking Quebeckers that their society or nation was "blocked in its forward thrust, torn or incomplete in its design, in a word, unfulfilled," became embodied in certain shared aspirations, especially among young intellectuals and the new middle class:
In Quebec we in fact heard a wide range of varied opinions ... taken together they came down on one side of the scale -for a greater recognition of the 'French-Canadian nation', a greater role for 'the State of Quebec', and greatly increased scope for the French language, especially in Quebec ... the idea of the 'emancipation' of Quebec (economic, social, and, in varying degrees, political) was central to all their thinking. .. as both the means and the symbol, whether thought of as total or relati~e.~ In spite of these apparent cornrnonalities, one Quebec separatist lawyer, appearing before one of the regional meetings, clearly articulated what was potentially at stake for the future of Canada:
We do not blame the English Canadians for anything; they have behaved as all majorities do. What we want is much simpler than that. We want complete fiscal powers in order to put into effect these political powers, so that we may organize our institutions and finally attain the full development of the French Canadian nation ... If the Commission were to come to the conclusion that CO-existence is in fact impossible or that the two nations do not want it, it could do what we lawyers do in similar situations: we recommend to married couples who cannot get along that they part for awhile and arrange their lives ~eparately.~~
In effect, in the midst of what one journalist later described as the "divorce atmosphere" of this period, it is perhaps not surprising that some English-speaking Canadians regarded the intensification of national disharmony as having reached "critical proportions." 86 For example, Dr. Paul Fox emphatically stated at the Commission's preliminary hearing that, "this Commission may be the last hope of saving Canadian Confederation ... of solving Canadian federal problems in general, objectively, rationally, and calmly." Furthermore, if the risk of 'divorce' as opposed to the "politics of compromise and conciliation," 87 was increasingly on the national agenda-a situation which arguably signified the ultimate symbol of maritallfamilial breakdown -it is perhaps inevitable that the Commission itself concluded its preliminary report by suggesting that the "vital centre" of Canadian nationhood was being threatened:
Canada, without being fully conscious of the fact, is passing through the greatest crisis in its history ... If it should persist and gather momentumitcould destroy Canada . .. It is not only one aspect of Canadian life that is at issue; the vital centre is in danger:
we mean the will to live together, at least under present condition^.^^ It should be noted, however, that analogies to maritallfamilial breakdown in attempting to articulate the conflict-ridden relations between French-and EnglishCanada were not wholly a new phenomenon that emerged in the crisis of the 1960s.
For instance, in a 1944 pamphlet entitled, Must Canada Split?, C.E. Silcox argued that, given what he perceived as the religious, cultural, and ideological "chasm between the French-Canadians and the Anglo-Canadians, between Quebec and the other provinces" as well as their fundamental "mutual incompatability", the idea of national unity was nothing more than an "insubstantial mirage." Consequently, in a rhetorical flourish of various and somewhat contradictory familial metaphors, he argued that the only possible solution was to grant complete independence to Quebec:
To forbid divorce of incompatible nations on the ground of economic exigencies alone is stupid, is as stupid as to forbid the separation of husband and wife who have lost their love and now nurse a perpetual grudge. To forbid the latter is to turn the home into a hell; to forbid the former is to convert the country into a hell ... Canada is now clearly not one nation, but two. To pretend that it isn't only aggravates the problem. Not God, but the British North America Act of 1867 joined them together. So why should the marriage not be annulled. In the womb of history, two distinct peoples have been conceived. Now that the day of parturition has come, we see that they are twins and not identical at that. Indeed, hardly even fraternal ... The Anglo-Canadians think of Quebec as the cross he is called upon to bear, as a family Apart from this largely English-Canadian construction of Canadian domestic relations as a continuum of marriage-divorce-intermarriage, the sense that the 'two founding races' had to 'get to know each other' in order to overcome the "misapprehension, misunderstanding, and ignorance of each other's natures, emotions, and feelings" was perhaps the most oft-cited English-Canadian solution to the problems of national unity. Thus, for many English-speaking Canadians who appeared before the Commission, the tensions between the two Canadas were conceived less in terms of historically-rooted constitutional problems, but more in terms of an emotional or a communication crisis. In their view, attaining a "true and lasting rapprochement" between the two cultures went beyond merely developing greater tolerance or alleviating prejudices. Rather, the achievement of stronger national bonds required, above all, the cultivation of a real sense of mutual understanding and appreciation, reconciliation and cooperation?' This emphasis on the necessity for improved communication between the two cultures was frequently articulated in familial terms. For instance, as one representative of the Edmonton Branch of the The University Women's Club stated, "communication is a way in which our understanding of each other may be improved. The members of one family must understand each other if there is to be unity and a strong, tranquil household." Similarly, Mr. Robert Thompson, appearing at the preliminary hearing, expressed the hope that the Commission would avoid generating "greater misunderstanding between members of the original cultures of Canada" through an overemphasis on "our differences." He also stressed that the promotion of greater 'maritallfamilial' communication should ultimately take priority over the political, economic, and constitutional adjustments necessary to address and redress many of the grievances articulated by French-speaking Canada:
I believe, however, that there are very real limits to what can be accomplished by a legalistic approach, and the greatest accomplishments are to be sought in the way of charity and mutual understanding. Essentially Confederation is a marriage -a marriage of peoples -and the type of marriage that is based on a legal interpretation of rights and duties can only end -is bound to end -in bickering, and ultimately in the divorce court. If you persuade your fellow Canadians that for the sake of this union -for the sake of their homeland -our homeland -the tolerance, the good humour, the forgiveness, the understanding, the practicality that is essential to any long-lasting association, is well worthwhile, you will have served your country very well indeed, and for which Canada as a nation will be all the stronger.Yz While this sentimentalized vision attempted to capture some of the essential ingredients perceived as necessary for fostering more harmonious national relations, many English-speaking Canadians also offered a broad spectrum of practical recommendations. In their view, these various proposals would create a more favourable national climate, in which an "increased awareness of each other"93 could be achieved. For instance, a greater understanding of the French language and culture through the extension of bilingual public ed~cation,'~ the encouragement of student and cultural exchange^,'^ and the wider dissemination and translation of the cultural products from both English-and French-speaking were often cited as fundamental for enhancing greater national understanding. Furthermore, the educational and unifying potential of the mass communications sect0rs,9~ of the arts,98 and even of the more 'objective' teaching of Canadian hist0ry,9~ were but afew areas that were repeatedly suggested as crucial in furthering the cause of national unity. In addition to these various formal mechanisms, many individuals and organizations also emphasized the necessity for a fundamental "change of attitudes", particularly in order to alleviate what French-speaking Canadians repeatedly described as English-speaking Canada's indifference or even hostility towards their language and cult~re."'~ Mr. Tassie of Carleton University perhaps best captured this sentiment, when he pointed out that, "underneath lies the deep feeling that you have to change something very much inside people before you can change what is outside them." 1°' translations in Canada which tended to exacerbate "mutual misunderstanding," Dr. Hayne of the Department of French at the University of Toronto remarked, "Of course it is a well known fact that translations are like women. When they are beautiful they are rarely faithful; when they are faithful they are not often beautiful." See Toronto Public Hearing In this respect, the family was often described not only as the primary institution in which the generational transmission of "national understanding" could be fostered and perpetuated,'02 but also as potentially the most resistent to the envisaged evolution of a bilingual and bicultural society. Mrs. Chadsey of the YWCA's National Council, for example, argued that this was partially due to the isolation of many Canadian mothers in the domestic sphere:
Women living and working in their homes .. are not personally involved or influenced by public or private organizations and only to acertain extent even by the mass media. This isolation from community life tends to strengthen their prejudices and they can have a strong influence on their families, particularly the young people.'03
Others participants, however, like Dr. Rae of Sir George Williams University, suggested more generally that, "where attitudes in the home are such as to depreciate the culture involved there is actually a resistance even to a thing as automatic as learning a language in s c h~o l . " '~ But for some English-speaking Canadians, the whole issue of official bilingualism engendered deep suspicions that some form of coercive state intrusion could potentially be involved. In their view, state intervention would ultimately infringe on their rights as parents to decide the nature of their children's e d u~a t i o n . '~~ Given these apprehensions, the important symbolic value of the 'bilingual family', particularly one of Anglo-Protestant extraction, was underscored when the Findlays appeared before the Toronto public hearing. As the only submission presented by an "individual Canadian family," Mr. and Mrs. Findlay described at length their "dogged determination" to get a French education for their children against what seemed to be virtually insurmountable odds. In response, the Commissioners not only praised their efforts as both "impressive7' and "heroic", but also suggested that they write "their history" and "make a best-seller out of it." More significant, perhaps, was that this was the only presentation at the public hearings that received a hearty round of applause.'06 also, Submission of The National Council of Women, Ottawa Preliminary Hearing (8 November 1963). 449. There were others, however, who argued just the opposite. For example, Dr. Paul Fox of the University of Toronto pointed out that, "this is going to require rearrangements in basic structures of our constitution. We are not going to get a basic rearrangement simply by hoping that we will all grow up to be friends together. 
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Although not mentioned at the public hearing, the Findlay's story had already been reported in the national press. See Bruce Findlay, "How Our Children Learned French In Spite of The School System," Maclean's (27 July 1963). 34-7..
While the general tone of the various public hearings seemed to suggest that English-speaking Canadians were indeed "waking up" to the complex problems involved in fostering an ongoing "national dialogue" with their "French-speaking Canadian brothers,"lm it should also be emphasized that some associations that appeared before the Commission were decidedly less sympathetic to the rising demands of French-speaking Quebec. For example, Mr. Shephard, representing the Canadian Protestant League, appropriated the language of familialism in an effort to articulate a radically divergent meaning of the nature of Canadian domestic relations. In his view, Quebec was not to be conceived as the 'frustrated wife' requiring greater nuptial understanding and spousal respect as others had implicitly suggested, but rather as the 'spoiled child' of Confederation who, unlike Newfoundland, for example, had failed to reach maturity:
Can it be, Mr. Chairman, that we still have a family of ten provinces, nine of which must now listen to the demands of one? Many other races have long since buried their ancestral animosities. Why not this one? For years we have been listening to the complaints of one spoiled member of the Confederation family too accustomed, we believe, to getting its own way. Every time it hollers for more attention many other things must be sacrificed to keep the peace in the family, to keep Canada united. Now, if anyone suggests to me that this one member is the largest, I feel like adding it is also the oldest and should be showing more signs of adulthood. The baby of the family, Newfoundland, living next door is not making anything like the demands of its big, old, grown-up brother. I suggest that this province does not want equality but superiority as its cherished aspiration ... There is no room any longer in our Confederation family for any one of its members with special privileges.lo8
Similarly, Kenneth McNaught, in his 1965 article entitled, "It's Time To Talk Divorce With Quebec," argued that the whole framework of Confederation was being systematically undermined by what he termed Quebec's "demagogic" and "neurotic nationalism" :
The only virtue in the Canadian experiment-and it was a great virtue-was its built-in purpose of toleration. If Quebec feels that she must discard two centuries of evolutionary growth in order to return to the womb of international latin civilization or to fulfil1 the mythic purposes of Laurentia, then obviously she has obliterated the purpose of the experiment itself. There is no point in fighting.Iw While French-and English-speaking Canada clearly constituted, what the Commission described as the 'chief protagonists' in the escalating national crisis, the often unambiguous construction of the two Canadas as two unitary, yet conflicting cultural and linguistic units, tended to obscure the various differences inscribed within these polarized social entities. Dr Montreal public hearing, for example, reminded the Commission that, "no conception of Quebec ... can be meaningful without recognizing the fundamental duality of Quebec within the duality of Canada." In this respect, Quebec and such metropolitan centres as Montreal were frequently described as symbolic microcosms of the cultural estrangement that tended to characterize relations between the two Canadas."" For instance, Mrs. Florence Stevens of L' Association Biculturelle de la Ville de MontrCal described her community on the island of Montreal as "made up of two groups of people existing in seemingly watertight compartments, isolated from each other by the barriers of language, custom, and sometimes religion.'"'' Similarly, Mr. D.E. Armstrong of Montreal stated that, "our churches, our schools, our clubs. our homes are, for the most part segregated." ' l 2
As two virtually self-contained entities, the absence of social interaction between the French-speaking majority and the English-speaking minority in the province was often articulated through such analogies as the coexistence of "two solitudes," the "thickness of silence" that tended to isolate the two communities, "separate parts of a two-part mosaic," and the "need for Montreal to get closer to M~ntreal.""~ Moreover, as one Chicoutimi resident pointed out, social relations between the two cultural groups could not be described as necessarily "good" or "bad," but as virtually "non-existent": "We get along alright? Oh, sure, certainly we do, like a family where the son-in-law never sees his mother-in-law." Consequently, at least one English-speaking Quebecker expressed the hope that "if the French and English within the province can get closer together we will set a wonderful example for the rest of Canada." ' l 4
At the same time, the concept of 'French-speaking Canada' itself was subject to at least two divergent interpretations. As suggested earlier, the Commission strongly advocated the concept of 'equal partnership' as defining French-speaking Canada's status within the complexion of the Canadian 'national family' and as a recognition of the dual character of Canadian nationhood. But, as the Commissioners consistently reiterated throughout the public hearings, this 'dominating idea' not only encom-passed French-speaking Quebec, but also those French-speaking minorities, such as the Acadians in New Brunswick, that had established communities in other Canadian provinces. In their view, one central component in officially recognizing the bilingual and bicultural nature of Canada revolved around an attempt to ensure that this latter group would be accorded the same special status, particularly in relation to the preservation of language and educational rights, as that enjoyed by the English-speaking minority in Q~e b e c . "~ Furthermore, the Commissioners also emphasized that the largely bilingual French-speaking minorities outside of Quebec held a crucial symbolic value insofar as they signified an important "bridge" between the two Canadas and, thus, a "cohesive force7' within the nation as a whole. '16 In contrast, Quebec separatists and the Communist Party of Canada, for example, defined the Canadian state in terms of the coexistence of 'two nations,' each with the concomitant right to self-determination and sovereignty. As Mr. Nelson Clarke of the Communist Party argued, "the state structure established by Confederation is in crisis because of a failure to recognize French Canada as a nation .. . the non-recognition of anational identity of French-Canada." Moreover, in his view, the only viable solution to the current crisis would involve the "constitutional re-organization of the state structure of Canada which would officially recognize the binational character of Canada." 'l7 While the Commissioners strongly rejected this 'two-nations' theory as defining the character of Canada's national structure, they did conclude that what was really at stake was that French-speaking Quebeckers and English-speaking Canadians held two radically divergent conceptions of nationhood. For the former, the term 'nation' was increasingly interlinked with the province of Quebec to the apparent steady exclusion of French-speaking minorities in the rest of Canada. Conversely, in the case of English-speaking Canadians, the concept of 'nation' tended to encompass the 'whole population of Canada' as part of a single national community. What this signified, above all, was that "most English-speaking Canadians don't think of nation." 'l8 This sense that English-speaking Canada did not, or perhaps more accurately, could not 'think like a nation,' was at least partially rooted in the strong regional and provincial loyalties as well as the diversity of the ethno-cultural identities inscribed in this highly non-homogeneous entity. Thus, while French-speaking Quebeckers often referred to English-speaking Canadians as "les Anglais" or "les Anglo-Saxons," thereby intimating the existence of an undifferentiated 'rest of Canada,' the Commissioners themselves concluded, after their first nation-wide tour, that Englishspeaking Canadians were really "united only by their common citizenship in Canada." I 19 Moreover, when Professor Michael Oliver of McGill University was asked at the preliminary hearing whether he thought English-speaking Canadians were conscious of sharing a culture and more specifically, what was really meant by the notion of an English-Canadian culture, he hesitated and replied that he would have "to think it over." lZ0 Throughout the course of the Commission's various public hearings, the strong ties of regionalism were articulated in various ways. For instance, Mr. O'Hearn of the Montreal Star argued that, "in as vast a country as this physically there will always be a dominance of regional interest. I don't think we can do anything to cure this. I think we can just attempt to ameliorate the situati~n."'~' Moreover, while the Maritime provinces remained somewhat marginalized in the nation-wide public hearings, one former resident of Newfoundland expressed a "unique kind of excitement" about the political developments in Quebec: "Being a native-born Newfoundlander, and perhaps having resisted the blandishments of Confederation long after Quebec, I may be called the original separatist." Iz2 But, perhaps one Nova Scotian best expressed the strong sense of regional loyalty and regional 'familial unity,' which he then qualified by an equally profound feeling of cultural estrangement from the French-speaking Acadian population:
The long history that we have in Nova Scotia and we have had many races here living together happily for several hundred years. I think we are all happy. Our difficulty is that sometimes we are more Nova Scotian than Canadian ... Of course, we have many Acadians in this province; a very delightful people. Few people have an opportunity to meet them and know them. Unfortunately they are in the opposite ends of the province, but the difficulty is in meeting and getting to know other people as we would like to do.IU In most respects, however, the intersection between regional loyalties and ethnic identities surfaced most forcefully in the Western provinces. Both British Columbia, described as "more separatist than Quebec," and the Prairie provinces, with their diversity of ethnic groups, were consistently referred to as those regions most indifferent or most resistent to the whole "delicate" issue of bilingualism and biculturalism. Thus, while the Commissioners persistently emphasized what they viewed as the fundamental difference between national and individual/voluntary bilingualism, a very frustrated Commission was forced to conclude that "there is a persistent fear in this area, at any rate, that there is an attempt to force individual bilingualism in the country." Moreover, while these Western Canadian reactions were often perceived as signifying the deep regional and cultural rift, particularly between the West and Quebec, there was also the more generalized estrangement between the 'West' and the 'East'. For example, as one representative of the Vancouver Community Arts Council reminded the Commission, the whole emphasis on greater national communication should be regarded as a "two-way affair," so that "those who live beyond the Rockies to the east may have a better understanding of what we stand for in the West." 124 But perhaps one of the main foci of concern for the Commission revolved around the various interpretations and reactions that emerged, particularly among certain increasingly politicized ethnic groups, around the second clause of its terms of reference. This clause specified that together with the investigation into "what steps should be taken to develop the Canadian Confederation on the basis of an equal partnership between the two founding races," the Commission would also take into account "the cultural contribution made by other ethnic groups to the cultural enrichment of Canada and the measures that should be taken to safeguard that contribution."
One principle concern among the countless ethno-cultural organizations that appeared at the public hearings was the fear that their cultural contribution to the "rich tapestry" of Canada was being overshadowed by the Commission's overemphasis on the two founding cultures as fundamentally defining the character of Canadian nationhood. Consequently, these groups of so-called new Canadians consistently protested that, since the concept of 'equal partnership7 was seemingly reserved for 'the two founding races,' in spite of the high proportion of non-French and non-English peoples comprising Canada's national family, they were being marginalized as second-class citizens within the hierarchical and 'undemocratic' categories established by the Commission and, indeed, within Canada itself. At the same time, many of the ethnic groups frequently articulated their desire to be accepted as "full and unqualified partners" within Canadian social and cultural life through the invocation of familial analogies. Describing themselves as the "adopted kids" and the "younger brothers" within the national community,128 these groups attempted to impress upon the Commission both their sense and hope of fully 'belonging' to the 'Canadian national family,' and their strong affective ties and loyalty to Canada. Thus, in spite of their desire to preserve and safeguard their diverse cultural identities and linguistic integrity, they intimated that this perceived democratic right ultimately posed no threat to national unity. In many respects, they sought to counter the claim made in the Commission's preliminary report that "the demands of certain ethnic groups" and their failure to recognize the fundamental duality of the nation was "aggravating the state of crisis in Canada." 129 But perhaps the most complex question that surfaced at the public hearings revolved around the status of nativeIndians and "Eskimos" within the Commission's terms of reference and indeed within the complexion of Canada itself. Although the Commissioner's preliminary report briefly acknowledged the historical importance and "unique position" of Canada's native populations, this fundamental issue remained by far the most marginalized throughout the course of the public hearings. Not surprisingly, the crux of the controversy between the Commission and the various native groups that appeared at the public hearings revolved around the concept of "two founding races." As one Sudbury woman pointed out, "Why is the Indian always forgotten? We are told that the BNA Act was between the French and the English-where was the Indian during this time?'In addition to the oft-repeated argument that Indian and Eskimo groups deserved to be regarded as the founding culture, Kahn-Tineta Horn, an Iroquois activist, attempted to create a 'space' for native groups within the Commission's terms of reference by interpreting the concept of 'race' in strictly biological terms. She argued that, because of the many intermarriage~ between early French settlers and indigenous inhabitants, Quebec's cultural complexion should be redefined as "French, French-Indian, and not French-Indian." At the same time, she presented yet another conception of Canadian nationhood, when she stated that, "There are two nations. There is the Indian nation and the Canadian nation." I3O The Commissioners, on the other hand, repeatedly defended their conception of the duality of Canadian nationhood by arguing that, "the present nation of Canada, which is a political entity that exists was actually not founded by Indians . . . there is a distinction between being here first and the expression 'founding race', namely, founding the present political entity known as Canada." 13' In effect, the Comrnissioners strongly intimated that, even though the presence of Indian and Eskimo groups had long predated the arrival of any European explorers and settlers, Canada's historical narrative had effectively begun in 1867, and that the concept of 'equal partnership' was ultimately the preserve of those French-and English-speaking groups that had established Confederation. In the end, Canada's First Nations were summarily excluded both from the concept of the 'two founding races' and from the notion of the subsequent 'cultural contribution of other ethnic groups.' Rendering their concerns with the Commission's terms of reference as virtually non-issues, these native groups were simply isolated and ignored.I3' Given the very complexities and diverse identities inscribed in the whole ambigu- ous and variously-defined concept of Canadian nationhood, it is perhaps not surprising that Dr. Andrew of the National Conference of Canadian Universities and Colleges argued that Canada's so-called "communications crisis" extended far beyond the one between French-and English-speaking Canada. In his view, the national crisis ultimately involved "the social and cultural communication of ten provinces, five regions, two founding groups," not to mention the question of multi-ethnic identities and the issue of Canada's aboriginal peoples. Indeed, as Dr. Andrews concluded, "communication is the great enemy of the Canadian society." '33 For other participants, however, these same centrifugal tendencies seemed to render any easy definition of Canada a virtual impossibility. Judge Lindal of The Canadian Ethnic Press Federation posed the problem as follows:
I sometimes think that the actual fact of Canada, the actual fact of Canada has no appropriate word (either in English or French). I have not been able to find it in English, and no French Canadian has been able to suggest one to me; so it is very difficult. Canada is a fact in itself, an unique fact, and therefore it is difficult to describe it.'" But underlying this attempt to grapple with the 'uniqueness' of Canada, the fundamental question posed by the Commission was whether it was possible to achieve national unity amidst the evident diversities. For at least some participants, this possibility became inextricably linked to promoting a greater sense of 'family-mindedness' among Canadians, regardless of their regional, racial, or ethnic background. For example, Mr. Walter Herbert of the Canada Foundation, appearing at the preliminary hearing, expressed the hope that the Commission's subsequent inquiry would achieve precisely that goal:
You will . . . hear on the one hand about things and situations and conditions which tend to keep people apart, which tend to make people treat each other as strangers and at arm's length. On the other hand, you will, I hope, hear presentations about things which tend to bring people together, to bring them together to enjoy the pleasures and the tribulations of a well-adjusted family . . . I would urge the Royal Commission to make an extraordinary effort to inform itself fully on matters which tend to bring our diversified people into harmonious relationships. . . which will make Canada a happier place for our children and our grandchildren.I3j
While Mr. Herbert invoked the sentimentalized image of the 'happy, united and well-adjusted family' to describe the ideal of Canadian domestic relations, Reverend Shorten of the United Church of Canada emphasized the necessity to cultivate a sense of familial belonging, which he articulated both in national and in universal terms:
Our nation was formed in part by people who came to our shores to find freedom, both political and religious. I suggest that there are many, many people in the world today who look to us as a nation for the hope that we may give them, too -either to enable them to live where they are, or to offer them a share in our home and as members of our family. Our cultures must look beyond ourselves to see know and accept one another so that the better we may see ourselves as members of the world family which includes all men.'36
For other participants, however, the Commission itself had, through the course of its public hearings, literally opened a 'Pandora's Box'. The concomitant result had been that, rather than cultivating enhanced national unity, a multiplicity of latent grievances had been allowed to surface and feelings of discontent and disharmony had been aggravated. In many respects, this sentiment was reflected in the gradual, but decided, shift in the tone of the hearings. At the preliminary hearing in 1963, for example, many of the participants seemed to share the sentiments of Dr. Andrew Stewart of the Canadian Association for Adult Education and of M.J. Alphonse Ouimet, the president of Radio-Canada, who regarded the Commission "as potentially one of the most important in our history as acountry" and as "the best memorial we could hope to erect to 100 years of Confederation." 13' TWO years later, however, some participants, including one representative of the United Church, argued that the very existence of the Commission had compelled the 'Canadian family' to undergo an unnecessarily protracted and ultimately negative process of self-analysis:
We think there is value in probably emphasizing in a positive way the broad general cultural inheritance which both French-Canadian and English-Canadian share. I think there is a growing feeling, among some segments of the population at least, that probably there are inherent dangers that have been created because of the very existence of the Commission, by too long a process of self-analysis on a national basis that creates problems and probably too little emphasis upon the positive factors that united us as a people ... I think that in terms of any crisis, if you may use the analogy, a family quite often can survive a number of crises if they do not indulge in a process of long self-analysis. I have the feeling . . . that perhaps this process of self-analysis is virtually being overdone at the present moment.13"
In the end, what emerged from the Commission's prolonged effort to grapple with the question of national unity was that Canada was riddled with a multitude of centrifugal identities. These not only included the fractious relations between Frenchand English-speaking Canada, but also the molecular attachments of region, province and racelethnicity. But the language of familialism, invoked in the political discussions surrounding the introduction of the 1946 Citizenship Act and during the national crisis of the early 1960s, attempted to capture the ideal and, indeed, the essence of Canadian national unity. Similar to the defining characteristics of the postwar modem family, ties of affection, mutual understanding, internal communication and, above all, a sense of belonging were the ingredients perceived as necessary to forge a 2485-86. national interest that could potentially override and compete with the divisive bonds that comprised Canada's national community. These same qualities and the symbolic linkage between the notion of citizenship and a sense of familial attachment to a long and highly-differentiated national genealogy were further signified through the official adoption of the 'Canadian family tree' motif by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration in the early 1960s and by the Multiculturalism Directorate in the 1 9 7 0~. '~~ It was during the postwar period, then, that the ideological construction and the discursive articulation of various meanings associated with the 'happy united family' became interlinked with an idealized notion of the 'Canadian family' as both the social foundation and the metaphorical microcosm of Canadian nationhood. If nothing else, this multifarious intersection between the 'private' and the 'political' testifies to the importance of approaching historical categories not as discrete and competing entities, but rather as interrelated parts of a complex whole.
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